Navy SEALs have secretly captured one of the most wanted terrorists in Iraq — the alleged mastermind of the murder and mutilation of four Blackwater USA security guards in Fallujah in 2004. And three of the SEALs who captured him are now facing criminal charges, sources told FoxNews.com.
The three, all members of the Navy's elite commando unit, have refused non-judicial punishment — called an admiral's mast — and have requested a trial by court-martial.
Ahmed Hashim Abed, whom the military code-named "Objective Amber," told investigators he was punched by his captors — and he had the bloody lip to prove it.
Now, instead of being lauded for bringing to justice a high-value target, three of the SEAL commandos, all enlisted, face assault charges and have retained lawyers.
Matthew McCabe, a Special Operations Petty Officer Second Class (SO-2), is facing three charges: dereliction of performance of duty for willfully failing to safeguard a detainee, making a false official statement, and assault.
Petty Officer Jonathan Keefe, SO-2, is facing charges of dereliction of performance of duty and making a false official statement.
Petty Officer Julio Huertas, SO-1, faces those same charges and an additional charge of impediment of an investigation.
The three SEALs will be arraigned separately on Dec. 7. Another three SEALs — two officers and an enlisted sailor — have been identified by investigators as witnesses but have not been charged.
FoxNews.com obtained the official handwritten statement from one of the three witnesses given on Sept. 3, hours after Abed was captured and still being held at the SEAL base at Camp Baharia. He was later taken to a cell in the U.S.-operated Green Zone in Baghdad.
The SEAL told investigators he had showered after the mission, gone to the kitchen and then decided to look in on the detainee.
"I gave the detainee a glance over and then left," the SEAL wrote. "I did not notice anything wrong with the detainee and he appeared in good health."
Lt. Col. Holly Silkman, spokeswoman for the special operations component of U.S. Central Command, confirmed Tuesday to FoxNews.com that three SEALs have been charged in connection with the capture of a detainee. She said their court martial is scheduled for January.
United States Central Command declined to discuss the detainee, but a legal source told FoxNews.com that the detainee was turned over to Iraqi authorities, to whom he made the abuse complaints. He was then returned to American custody. The SEAL leader reported the charge up the chain of command, and an investigation ensued.
The source said intelligence briefings provided to the SEALs stated that "Objective Amber" planned the 2004 Fallujah ambush, and "they had been tracking this guy for some time."
The Fallujah atrocity came to symbolize the brutality of the enemy in Iraq and the degree to which a homegrown insurgency was extending its grip over Iraq.
The four Blackwater agents were transporting supplies for a catering company when they were ambushed and killed by gunfire and grenades. Insurgents burned the bodies and dragged them through the city. They hanged two of the bodies on a bridge over the Euphrates River for the world press to photograph.
Intelligence sources identified Abed as the ringleader, but he had evaded capture until September.
The military is sensitive to charges of detainee abuse highlighted in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. The Navy charged four SEALs with abuse in 2004 in connection with detainee treatment.
Foxnews.com
2009-11-02
10th SFG(A) pictures from German magazine
10th SFG(A) pictures from German magazine.
Special Forces training in Germany.
Nice recent pictures.
Download 10th SFG(A) pics
Special Forces training in Germany.
Nice recent pictures.
Download 10th SFG(A) pics
US Navy SEALs in Afghanistan Video
US Navy SEALs in Afghanistan Video.
3:34
Cool video, just click and download!
Download SEALs In A-Stan Up Close
3:34
Cool video, just click and download!
Download SEALs In A-Stan Up Close
2009-08-07
Three Coastguardsmen Left in SEAL Quest
Three Coastguardsmen Left in SEAL Quest
First there were 19 who were whittled down to 12. Then only five were left standing.
Now, after one of the world's most crushing selection programs, only two remain - well, three, if you count the one who was rolled back into the initial phase of the school.
For the first time in its storied history, the Coast Guard is on track to have two of its own earn the coveted trident badge of a Navy SEAL. The two officers have reached the third phase of initial SEAL selection after joining Basic Underwater Demolition School class 276 in March, enduring the grueling mental and physical travails that weed out all but the hardiest warriors.
"I'm very proud of these guys," said Master Chief Petty Officer Darrick DeWitt, the senior enlisted advisor for the Coast Guard's Deployable Operations Group, which ran the selection process for the service.
"We wanted to make sure we sent people with good character and good values. I think we did that," he added in a telephone interview with Military.com. "These guys not only represented the Coast Guard well, but represented their country well."
After a two-year effort to leverage the expertise of Naval Special Warfare and the Coast Guard's new role in homeland security and maritime special operations, the service selected its first group of Coastguardsmen to become commandos late last summer.
Coast Guard officials say they hope the SEAL-trained Coasties will seed the rest of the force with valuable skills learned in special operations training and operations and bring back to their sea service a bit of the esprit de corps found in the commando ranks.
For Naval Special Warfare, the pressure to grow its force makes an injection of well-vetted candidates to their ranks a boon, cutting out the hassle of dealing with recruits who don't have what it takes to become a SEAL.
"We're just glad to get good candidates," said Lt. Commander Shane Reilly, the executive officer at the Naval Special Warfare Basic Training Command in Coronado, Calif. "With the war going on, we're under a lot of pressure to increase [special operations forces] and we walk a fine line … without bending standards."
After reviewing 19 applications back in August 2008, evaluators tapped 12 Coastguardsmen to run through a week-long selection process in Panama City, Fla., that included physical tests, mental evaluations and exercises that gave the wannabe frogmen a taste of what the legendary Basic Underwater Demolition School, or BUDS, is all about.
The Coast Guard declined to provide any further details on the SEAL candidates' identities for security reasons.
In the end, five made the cut, including four officers - a civil engineer, two cutter officers and one assigned to the district staff - and an enlisted man who serves as a boarding officer at a station in California.
The enlisted Coastie washed out during the early part of the Navy's selection process when he came up just short on a physical qualification.
"It surprised me," DeWitt said of the Coastie, and Reilly added that the man missed the standard by a "very small margin."
"But, you know, they have tough standards," DeWitt said. "We'll see if he wants to come back for a second round."
That left four officers who made it into what many believe is the most physically and mentally difficult assessment program in the world. Early morning beach runs, cold water sit ups, sand in every crevice for days, no food, no sleep … you get the picture. And all the while SEAL instructors are goading you to quit.
And one did.
During the toughest phase of BUDS, one of the four remaining Coasties rang the infamous bell that signaled his voluntary exit from the program, leaving three to complete the course.
Later, another of the officers was injured during the assessment - a frequent cause of SEAL candidate drop outs - and was rolled back into a new class to start from the beginning of BUDS.
Though having only three Coasties left in a program that originally sported nearly 20 qualified applicants represents an 85 percent attrition rate, neither Reilly nor DeWitt are concerned.
"Our goal is not to just help out the Coast Guard, it's to help out the nation," DeWitt said. "If we can end up with three or two or one, and we can contribute in that way, then that's our goal."
According to Coast Guard officials, only five Coastguardsmen have forwarded paperwork to try out for this year's class of wannabe SEALs. But the officials also point out that last year's applications came in late on the August deadline.
DeWitt also said the service has relaxed a few of the application requirements, including dropping the mandate that prospective SEALs be qualified weapons experts since BUDS creates expert marksmen through its own training.
By all accounts, the Navy and Coast Guard see this program as a worthwhile one that will continue for several more years.
"It's a long road for them," Reilly said. "But when they do go out and join those teams, I'm sure they'll fit in just fine."
http://www.military.com/news/article/three-coastguardsmen-left-in-seal-quest.html
First there were 19 who were whittled down to 12. Then only five were left standing.
Now, after one of the world's most crushing selection programs, only two remain - well, three, if you count the one who was rolled back into the initial phase of the school.
For the first time in its storied history, the Coast Guard is on track to have two of its own earn the coveted trident badge of a Navy SEAL. The two officers have reached the third phase of initial SEAL selection after joining Basic Underwater Demolition School class 276 in March, enduring the grueling mental and physical travails that weed out all but the hardiest warriors.
"I'm very proud of these guys," said Master Chief Petty Officer Darrick DeWitt, the senior enlisted advisor for the Coast Guard's Deployable Operations Group, which ran the selection process for the service.
"We wanted to make sure we sent people with good character and good values. I think we did that," he added in a telephone interview with Military.com. "These guys not only represented the Coast Guard well, but represented their country well."
After a two-year effort to leverage the expertise of Naval Special Warfare and the Coast Guard's new role in homeland security and maritime special operations, the service selected its first group of Coastguardsmen to become commandos late last summer.
Coast Guard officials say they hope the SEAL-trained Coasties will seed the rest of the force with valuable skills learned in special operations training and operations and bring back to their sea service a bit of the esprit de corps found in the commando ranks.
For Naval Special Warfare, the pressure to grow its force makes an injection of well-vetted candidates to their ranks a boon, cutting out the hassle of dealing with recruits who don't have what it takes to become a SEAL.
"We're just glad to get good candidates," said Lt. Commander Shane Reilly, the executive officer at the Naval Special Warfare Basic Training Command in Coronado, Calif. "With the war going on, we're under a lot of pressure to increase [special operations forces] and we walk a fine line … without bending standards."
After reviewing 19 applications back in August 2008, evaluators tapped 12 Coastguardsmen to run through a week-long selection process in Panama City, Fla., that included physical tests, mental evaluations and exercises that gave the wannabe frogmen a taste of what the legendary Basic Underwater Demolition School, or BUDS, is all about.
The Coast Guard declined to provide any further details on the SEAL candidates' identities for security reasons.
In the end, five made the cut, including four officers - a civil engineer, two cutter officers and one assigned to the district staff - and an enlisted man who serves as a boarding officer at a station in California.
The enlisted Coastie washed out during the early part of the Navy's selection process when he came up just short on a physical qualification.
"It surprised me," DeWitt said of the Coastie, and Reilly added that the man missed the standard by a "very small margin."
"But, you know, they have tough standards," DeWitt said. "We'll see if he wants to come back for a second round."
That left four officers who made it into what many believe is the most physically and mentally difficult assessment program in the world. Early morning beach runs, cold water sit ups, sand in every crevice for days, no food, no sleep … you get the picture. And all the while SEAL instructors are goading you to quit.
And one did.
During the toughest phase of BUDS, one of the four remaining Coasties rang the infamous bell that signaled his voluntary exit from the program, leaving three to complete the course.
Later, another of the officers was injured during the assessment - a frequent cause of SEAL candidate drop outs - and was rolled back into a new class to start from the beginning of BUDS.
Though having only three Coasties left in a program that originally sported nearly 20 qualified applicants represents an 85 percent attrition rate, neither Reilly nor DeWitt are concerned.
"Our goal is not to just help out the Coast Guard, it's to help out the nation," DeWitt said. "If we can end up with three or two or one, and we can contribute in that way, then that's our goal."
According to Coast Guard officials, only five Coastguardsmen have forwarded paperwork to try out for this year's class of wannabe SEALs. But the officials also point out that last year's applications came in late on the August deadline.
DeWitt also said the service has relaxed a few of the application requirements, including dropping the mandate that prospective SEALs be qualified weapons experts since BUDS creates expert marksmen through its own training.
By all accounts, the Navy and Coast Guard see this program as a worthwhile one that will continue for several more years.
"It's a long road for them," Reilly said. "But when they do go out and join those teams, I'm sure they'll fit in just fine."
http://www.military.com/news/article/three-coastguardsmen-left-in-seal-quest.html
2009-06-09
US Special Forces Sent to Train Pakistanis
WASHINGTON --
The U.S. is sending Special Forces teams into one of Pakistan's most violent regions as part of a push to accelerate the training of the Pakistani military and make it a more effective ally in the fight against insurgents there.
Senior U.S. officials said 25 to 50 Special Forces personnel are deploying to two new training camps in Baluchistan, a Taliban stronghold on the porous Afghan-Pakistani border. The deployment brings U.S. personnel deeper than before into tribal regions of Pakistan, which the Obama administration views as among the world's most-dangerous flashpoints.
The Special Forces personnel will focus on training Pakistan's Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force responsible for battling the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, who cross freely between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the officials said. The U.S. trainers aren't meant to fight alongside the Pakistanis or accompany them into battle, in part because there will be so few Special Forces personnel in the two training camps.
A senior American military officer said he hoped Islamabad would gradually allow the U.S. to expand its training footprint inside Pakistan's borders. A former U.S. official familiar with the plans said the deployments would "get more American eyes and ears" into the strategically important region.
The project, which draws on proposals first discussed under the Bush administration, is a joint effort with the U.K., senior U.S. officials said. The U.K. plans to help fund the training, although it is unclear if British military personnel would take part in the initiative. British officials have been pushing for such an effort for several years. It builds on small-scale, U.S. training efforts already under way in the northern part of Pakistan.
The Pakistani and British embassies in Washington declined to comment. The U.S. military's Central Command, which oversees operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, also declined to comment.
The Pentagon has asked Congress to allocate $400 million this year for a new "Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund" that is designed to allow U.S. military commanders to quickly direct money to specific Pakistani training and equipping needs. The money, the first installment of a five-year program, would be funneled through Central Command rather than the State Department.
Senior U.S. commanders argue that the arrangement would allow them to ensure Pakistan uses the money to train its forces in counterinsurgency, rather than in conventional warfare.
Pakistan has regularly rebuffed Pentagon offers to provide military trainers, saying U.S. trainers would be irresistible targets for the country's militants. Many Pakistani officers also say Pakistan's primary threat comes from India, not the Taliban, and question the utility of counterinsurgency training.
A senior Defense official said Pakistan has in recent weeks warmed to the idea of accepting training assistance from the U.S., after the civilian government of President Asif Ali Zardari realized that militants pose an existential danger to their country. "They finally get it," the official said.
Baluchistan is believed to harbor an array of senior leaders from al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and other armed groups. The area is also seen as strategically important because it borders Afghanistan and Iran and is home to a strong separatist movement.
Under the current plans, the U.S. is deploying two Special Forces Operational Detachments Alpha to the region. So-called ODAs typically have 12 soldiers, but a U.S. official said the teams might be augmented to help speed training work.
Special Forces teams are seen as ideal for the deployments because they are used to operating clandestinely and in harsh conditions with little external support.
Source:
http://www.military-world.net/Afghanistan/1389.html
The U.S. is sending Special Forces teams into one of Pakistan's most violent regions as part of a push to accelerate the training of the Pakistani military and make it a more effective ally in the fight against insurgents there.
Senior U.S. officials said 25 to 50 Special Forces personnel are deploying to two new training camps in Baluchistan, a Taliban stronghold on the porous Afghan-Pakistani border. The deployment brings U.S. personnel deeper than before into tribal regions of Pakistan, which the Obama administration views as among the world's most-dangerous flashpoints.
The Special Forces personnel will focus on training Pakistan's Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force responsible for battling the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, who cross freely between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the officials said. The U.S. trainers aren't meant to fight alongside the Pakistanis or accompany them into battle, in part because there will be so few Special Forces personnel in the two training camps.
A senior American military officer said he hoped Islamabad would gradually allow the U.S. to expand its training footprint inside Pakistan's borders. A former U.S. official familiar with the plans said the deployments would "get more American eyes and ears" into the strategically important region.
The project, which draws on proposals first discussed under the Bush administration, is a joint effort with the U.K., senior U.S. officials said. The U.K. plans to help fund the training, although it is unclear if British military personnel would take part in the initiative. British officials have been pushing for such an effort for several years. It builds on small-scale, U.S. training efforts already under way in the northern part of Pakistan.
The Pakistani and British embassies in Washington declined to comment. The U.S. military's Central Command, which oversees operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, also declined to comment.
The Pentagon has asked Congress to allocate $400 million this year for a new "Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund" that is designed to allow U.S. military commanders to quickly direct money to specific Pakistani training and equipping needs. The money, the first installment of a five-year program, would be funneled through Central Command rather than the State Department.
Senior U.S. commanders argue that the arrangement would allow them to ensure Pakistan uses the money to train its forces in counterinsurgency, rather than in conventional warfare.
Pakistan has regularly rebuffed Pentagon offers to provide military trainers, saying U.S. trainers would be irresistible targets for the country's militants. Many Pakistani officers also say Pakistan's primary threat comes from India, not the Taliban, and question the utility of counterinsurgency training.
A senior Defense official said Pakistan has in recent weeks warmed to the idea of accepting training assistance from the U.S., after the civilian government of President Asif Ali Zardari realized that militants pose an existential danger to their country. "They finally get it," the official said.
Baluchistan is believed to harbor an array of senior leaders from al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and other armed groups. The area is also seen as strategically important because it borders Afghanistan and Iran and is home to a strong separatist movement.
Under the current plans, the U.S. is deploying two Special Forces Operational Detachments Alpha to the region. So-called ODAs typically have 12 soldiers, but a U.S. official said the teams might be augmented to help speed training work.
Special Forces teams are seen as ideal for the deployments because they are used to operating clandestinely and in harsh conditions with little external support.
Source:
http://www.military-world.net/Afghanistan/1389.html
Demand for elite forces growing fast
As the U.S. and its allies pressure insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan, there will be a greater need for intelligence in North Africa where extremists seek sanctuary, the military's top special operations commander told Congress on Thursday.
Adm. Eric T. Olson, head of U.S. Special Operations Command, told the House Armed Services terrorism subcommittee Thursday that increased military pressure "will not necessarily end the (insurgent) activity, it will shift some of the sanctuaries to other places."
Counterterrorism officials have warned that battle-hardened extremists have been moving from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to safe havens in north and east Africa, bringing sophisticated terrorist tactics with them.
Olson also said that it will take a long, patient effort to defeat insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan and win the hearts and minds of civilians.
Olson also told the subcommittee that his elite special operations forces can't grow fast enough to meet increasing global demands, so the Pentagon is depending more heavily on support that is not always available from regular forces.
He turned to intelligence concerns in North Africa in response to a question from Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., chairman of the subcommittee.
Smith asked Olson if the special operations forces could use more intelligence and surveillance coverage in North Africa, where al-Qaida has set up a franchise in the vast ungoverned areas.
"We've got to find ways of having a better understanding of what is happening there," Olson said, adding that increased surveillance would be one answer.
In Pakistan, Olson said the U.S. must be careful not to take any action that suggests the Pakistan military is an extension of the U.S. military. And in Afghanistan, he said, the key is to have as small a footprint as possible, and work "village by village, valley by valley."
"We need to get better at countering Taliban propaganda," added Smith, saying that the U.S., including Olson's special operations forces, must work with the locals to get the Afghan people "on our side."
He said he needs the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines to provide more logistics, intelligence, communications and air transportation support for his troops overseas.
"The non-availability of these force enablers has become our most vexing issue in the operational environment," Olson said.
Special operations forces can only grow by 3 percent to 5 percent a year, Olson said. But the need for those units to deploy in hot spots around the globe is outpacing that growth, he said.
The mobile, specially trained units carry out more secretive anti-terror missions, and in a number of countries they are used to train foreign forces.
In most cases, however, they rely on their brethren in larger, conventional military units to fuel their helicopters, fix their trucks, transport their troops and provide surveillance and other information.
Olson said there is still a shortage of manned and unmanned surveillance aircraft and systems, which are critical for his forces on the warfront.
Another challenge, he said, will be to ensure that special operations units serving in dangerous areas of Iraq get the support they need as the larger, conventional units leave the country.
There are 135,000 U.S. forces in Iraq, and they are scheduled to leave the cities by June. President Barack Obama has said that all combat forces will be out of the country by the end of August 2010, and all forces will be out of Iraq by the end of 2011.
Source:
http://www.military-world.net/Afghanistan/1538.html
Adm. Eric T. Olson, head of U.S. Special Operations Command, told the House Armed Services terrorism subcommittee Thursday that increased military pressure "will not necessarily end the (insurgent) activity, it will shift some of the sanctuaries to other places."
Counterterrorism officials have warned that battle-hardened extremists have been moving from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to safe havens in north and east Africa, bringing sophisticated terrorist tactics with them.
Olson also said that it will take a long, patient effort to defeat insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan and win the hearts and minds of civilians.
Olson also told the subcommittee that his elite special operations forces can't grow fast enough to meet increasing global demands, so the Pentagon is depending more heavily on support that is not always available from regular forces.
He turned to intelligence concerns in North Africa in response to a question from Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., chairman of the subcommittee.
Smith asked Olson if the special operations forces could use more intelligence and surveillance coverage in North Africa, where al-Qaida has set up a franchise in the vast ungoverned areas.
"We've got to find ways of having a better understanding of what is happening there," Olson said, adding that increased surveillance would be one answer.
In Pakistan, Olson said the U.S. must be careful not to take any action that suggests the Pakistan military is an extension of the U.S. military. And in Afghanistan, he said, the key is to have as small a footprint as possible, and work "village by village, valley by valley."
"We need to get better at countering Taliban propaganda," added Smith, saying that the U.S., including Olson's special operations forces, must work with the locals to get the Afghan people "on our side."
He said he needs the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines to provide more logistics, intelligence, communications and air transportation support for his troops overseas.
"The non-availability of these force enablers has become our most vexing issue in the operational environment," Olson said.
Special operations forces can only grow by 3 percent to 5 percent a year, Olson said. But the need for those units to deploy in hot spots around the globe is outpacing that growth, he said.
The mobile, specially trained units carry out more secretive anti-terror missions, and in a number of countries they are used to train foreign forces.
In most cases, however, they rely on their brethren in larger, conventional military units to fuel their helicopters, fix their trucks, transport their troops and provide surveillance and other information.
Olson said there is still a shortage of manned and unmanned surveillance aircraft and systems, which are critical for his forces on the warfront.
Another challenge, he said, will be to ensure that special operations units serving in dangerous areas of Iraq get the support they need as the larger, conventional units leave the country.
There are 135,000 U.S. forces in Iraq, and they are scheduled to leave the cities by June. President Barack Obama has said that all combat forces will be out of the country by the end of August 2010, and all forces will be out of Iraq by the end of 2011.
Source:
http://www.military-world.net/Afghanistan/1538.html
2009-01-12
2009-01-01
Pic
In Kurdish northern Iraq, a U.S. special-forces soldier aims a .50-cal sniper rifle
at guerrillas of Ansar al-Islam. The Al-Qaeda-linked Ansar was driven from Iraqi villages into the mountains along the Iranian border by Kurdish and U.S. Forces."
Photograph by Kate Brooks-Corbis
U.S. Special Forces and Afghan Militia Force [AMF] mercenaries confront villagers during a raid upon Narizah in late August [Wally Santana, AP photo].
A US Army Special Forces soldier stands guard as Afghan civilians and Northern Alliance militia members look on in Khwaja Bahuaddin, Afghanistan. [Brennan Linsely, AP]
Delta Force 2
As a counter-terrorist group, Delta's main function is in hostage rescue. During Operation Just Cause Delta got their chance to do just that. Kurt Muse, an American businessman operating an underground radio station, had been jailed in the city of Modelo. A 160th SOAR MH-6 transported a team of troopers to the rooftop of the jail. The team fought its way down to the second floor and blew the door to Muse' cell, freeing him without injury. As the team and Muse made their way to the roof and the waiting MH-6, Kurt Muse counted at least five bodies. Not all had been killed; one terrified guard had been handcuffed to a staircase railing. Lifting off, the small helicopter was hit by small arms fire and fell to the street below. The pilot slid the aircraft along the ground to a parking lot and attempted to take off again. The aircraft was hit by ground fire again and hit the ground, this time permanently. A passing UH-60 spotted the infrared spotlight held up by a Delta trooper, and soldiers from the 6th Infantry Regiment came to their rescue. Four Delta operators were wounded, but Delta had "officially" validated their existance and saved Kurt Muse' life.
Delta also saw action in Desert Storm, although the full extent of what they did there has not been revealed. Delta Troopers provided security for General Norman Schwartzkopf and also took part in some missions into Iraq to locate Scud misile launchers for destruction. Delta recieved some unwanted publicity in the disasterous UN Campaign to stabilize the country of Somolia. During their mission in Mogadishu, Somolia, they assaulted different safe houses containing high-ranking members of warring clans and took them prisoner. Unfortunately, during their last mission two of the suport helicopters from the 160th SOAR were shot down. Two Delta operators were killed defending the survivors of the second crash, and at least one was killed in an on-foot extraction through a city populated with locals riled up against the Americans.
Operators from the 1st SFOD were cruicial to the invasion of Iraq in early 2003. It is reported that they were in place ahead of time in the capital of Bagdhad, building networks of informants while eavesdropping and sabotaging Iraqi communications lines.
Delta works closely with the 160th SOAR for air support, but they also have their own fleet of helicopters (the aviation platoon). Painted in civilian colors and with fake registration numbers, the helicopters can deploy with Delta operators and mount gun pods to provide air support as well as transportation. Delta/CAG also works with the CIA's Special Activities Staff.
Good Reads:
"DELTA, America's Elite Counterterrorist Force" Terry Griswold ISBN 0-87938-615-0
"Blackhawk Down" Mark Bowden ISBN 0-87113-738-0
Delta also saw action in Desert Storm, although the full extent of what they did there has not been revealed. Delta Troopers provided security for General Norman Schwartzkopf and also took part in some missions into Iraq to locate Scud misile launchers for destruction. Delta recieved some unwanted publicity in the disasterous UN Campaign to stabilize the country of Somolia. During their mission in Mogadishu, Somolia, they assaulted different safe houses containing high-ranking members of warring clans and took them prisoner. Unfortunately, during their last mission two of the suport helicopters from the 160th SOAR were shot down. Two Delta operators were killed defending the survivors of the second crash, and at least one was killed in an on-foot extraction through a city populated with locals riled up against the Americans.
Operators from the 1st SFOD were cruicial to the invasion of Iraq in early 2003. It is reported that they were in place ahead of time in the capital of Bagdhad, building networks of informants while eavesdropping and sabotaging Iraqi communications lines.
Delta works closely with the 160th SOAR for air support, but they also have their own fleet of helicopters (the aviation platoon). Painted in civilian colors and with fake registration numbers, the helicopters can deploy with Delta operators and mount gun pods to provide air support as well as transportation. Delta/CAG also works with the CIA's Special Activities Staff.
Good Reads:
"DELTA, America's Elite Counterterrorist Force" Terry Griswold ISBN 0-87938-615-0
"Blackhawk Down" Mark Bowden ISBN 0-87113-738-0
Delta Force
The 1st SFOD-Delta (Delta force) is one the Federal Government's CT (Counter Terrorist) groups. Also known as CAG (Combat Applications Group) the Pentagon manages to tightly control what is known about this Unit. Their soldiers are recruited from the U.S. Army, mainly from the Special Forces Green Berets and Rangers. Their main compound is in a remote area of Fort Bragg and it is rumored that up to 2,500 personnel are present at this facility.
The TO (Table of Order) for Delta consists of three operational squadrons, a support squadron, a signal squadron, an aviation platoon, and what is termed the "Funny Platoon". This funny platoon is reported to be the only JSOC unit including female operators. Selection for all of these units is rigourous with more focus on mental abilities and toughness than physical.
Training involves runs through CQB (Close Quarters Battle) killing houses designed to teach teams and individuals how to assault buildings that have been captured by terrorists. Selective firing (whether or not to shoot a target) as well as the double tap (shooting the target twice to make sure that the target does not get up again) are instilled in the Counter-terrorism specialists.
Their facility at Bragg is reported to be considered the best special operation training facility in the world. The CQB indoor training range has earned the ominous nick-name, "The House of Horrors". The Facility comes equipped with mock-up of trains and buses for practice in tubular assaults, and there is reported to be a section of a wide-body jet in the units "aircraft room".
The TO (Table of Order) for Delta consists of three operational squadrons, a support squadron, a signal squadron, an aviation platoon, and what is termed the "Funny Platoon". This funny platoon is reported to be the only JSOC unit including female operators. Selection for all of these units is rigourous with more focus on mental abilities and toughness than physical.
Training involves runs through CQB (Close Quarters Battle) killing houses designed to teach teams and individuals how to assault buildings that have been captured by terrorists. Selective firing (whether or not to shoot a target) as well as the double tap (shooting the target twice to make sure that the target does not get up again) are instilled in the Counter-terrorism specialists.
Their facility at Bragg is reported to be considered the best special operation training facility in the world. The CQB indoor training range has earned the ominous nick-name, "The House of Horrors". The Facility comes equipped with mock-up of trains and buses for practice in tubular assaults, and there is reported to be a section of a wide-body jet in the units "aircraft room".
What are the Special Forces MOS's?
The CMF 18 is subdivided into five accession Military Occupational Specialties (MOS's): 18A, Detachment Commander; 18B, SF Weapons Sergeant; 18C, SF Engineer Sergeant; 18D, SF Medical Sergeant; and 18E, SF Communications Sergeant. Each SF volunteer receives extensive training in a specialty, which prepares him for his future assignment in a SF unit. SF units are designed to operate either unilaterally or in support of and combined with native military and paramilitary forces. Levels of employment for Special Operations forces include advising and assisting host governments, involvement in continental United States-based training, and direct participation in combat operations. CMF 18 MOS's:
(1) 18A - SF Detachment Commander. Training includes: teaching the officer student the planning and leadership skills he will need to direct and employ other members of his detachment.
(2) 18B - SF Weapons Sergeant. Training includes: Tactics, anti-armor weapons utilization, functioning of all types of U.S. and foreign light weapons, indirect fire operations, man-portable air defense weapons, weapons emplacement, and integrated combined arms fire control planning.
(3) 18C - SF Engineer Sergeant. Training includes: Construction skills, field fortifications, and use of explosive demolitions.
(4) 18D - SF Medical Sergeant. Training includes: Advanced medical procedures to include trauma management and surgical procedures.
(5) 18E - SF Communications Sergeant. Training includes: Installation and operation of SF high frequency and burst communications equipment, antenna theory, radio wave propagation, and SF communication operations procedures and techniques. Training culminates with an around-the-world communications field performance exercise.
bragg.army.mil
(1) 18A - SF Detachment Commander. Training includes: teaching the officer student the planning and leadership skills he will need to direct and employ other members of his detachment.
(2) 18B - SF Weapons Sergeant. Training includes: Tactics, anti-armor weapons utilization, functioning of all types of U.S. and foreign light weapons, indirect fire operations, man-portable air defense weapons, weapons emplacement, and integrated combined arms fire control planning.
(3) 18C - SF Engineer Sergeant. Training includes: Construction skills, field fortifications, and use of explosive demolitions.
(4) 18D - SF Medical Sergeant. Training includes: Advanced medical procedures to include trauma management and surgical procedures.
(5) 18E - SF Communications Sergeant. Training includes: Installation and operation of SF high frequency and burst communications equipment, antenna theory, radio wave propagation, and SF communication operations procedures and techniques. Training culminates with an around-the-world communications field performance exercise.
bragg.army.mil
What is the SFQC?
The SFQC teaches and develops the skills necessary for effective utilization of the SF Soldier. Duties in CMF 18 primarily involve participation in Special Operations interrelated fields of unconventional warfare. These include foreign internal defense and direct action missions as part of a small operations team or detachment. Duties at other levels involve command, control, and support functions. Frequently, duties require regional orientation, to include foreign language training and in-country experience. The SF places emphasis not only on unconventional tactics, but also knowledge of nations in waterborne, desert, jungle, mountain, or arctic operations.
After successful completion of SFAS, officers who have not already attended their Advanced Course will attend either the Infantry or Armor Career Captain's Course. Enlisted Soldiers will return to their home station and await receipt of PCS orders to Fort Bragg, NC. Including SFAS, the SFQC is comprised of six phases. SFAS is considered Phase One. All of remaining phases are as described below:
SFQC (Phase II): Individual Skills - During this phase of SF training Soldiers in-process at Fort Bragg and begin their SF training. This phase is approximately 13 weeks in duration and includes training in Small Unit Tactics, SF Tactics, Survival Skills and Language and Cultural Training.
SFQC (Phase III): MOS Qualification Phase - During this phase of SF Training Soldiers will receive MOS training for their newly assigned Special Forces MOS. Training for this phase is approximately 15 weeks and includes additional language training, SF Common tasks, Advanced Special Operations Techniques (ASOT), and Interagency Operations.
SFQC (Phase IV): Language Training - Based on each Soldier's individual language skills, he will advance through language training to prepare him to serve in SF. Additionally, while receiving language training Soldiers will be trained in warrior skills, such as Combatives. This phase may be up to 14 weeks in duration or may be exempted if the Soldier already possesses an appropriate SF language. Select Soldiers may have the opportunity for advanced language training based on individual language proficiency and the needs of SF.
SFQC (Phase V): Collective Training Phase - During this phase Soldiers will hone their newly acquired SF skills in a realistic Unconventional Warfare (UW) culmination exercise. This phase is approximately 4 weeks in duration.
SFQC (Phase VI): Out-Processing and initial assignment.
bragg.army.mil
After successful completion of SFAS, officers who have not already attended their Advanced Course will attend either the Infantry or Armor Career Captain's Course. Enlisted Soldiers will return to their home station and await receipt of PCS orders to Fort Bragg, NC. Including SFAS, the SFQC is comprised of six phases. SFAS is considered Phase One. All of remaining phases are as described below:
SFQC (Phase II): Individual Skills - During this phase of SF training Soldiers in-process at Fort Bragg and begin their SF training. This phase is approximately 13 weeks in duration and includes training in Small Unit Tactics, SF Tactics, Survival Skills and Language and Cultural Training.
SFQC (Phase III): MOS Qualification Phase - During this phase of SF Training Soldiers will receive MOS training for their newly assigned Special Forces MOS. Training for this phase is approximately 15 weeks and includes additional language training, SF Common tasks, Advanced Special Operations Techniques (ASOT), and Interagency Operations.
SFQC (Phase IV): Language Training - Based on each Soldier's individual language skills, he will advance through language training to prepare him to serve in SF. Additionally, while receiving language training Soldiers will be trained in warrior skills, such as Combatives. This phase may be up to 14 weeks in duration or may be exempted if the Soldier already possesses an appropriate SF language. Select Soldiers may have the opportunity for advanced language training based on individual language proficiency and the needs of SF.
SFQC (Phase V): Collective Training Phase - During this phase Soldiers will hone their newly acquired SF skills in a realistic Unconventional Warfare (UW) culmination exercise. This phase is approximately 4 weeks in duration.
SFQC (Phase VI): Out-Processing and initial assignment.
bragg.army.mil
What is SFAS?
The career management field (CMF) 18 includes positions concerned with the employment of highly specialized elements to accomplish specifically directed missions in times of peace and war. Many of these missions are conducted at times when employment of conventional military forces is not feasible or is not considered in the best interest of the United States. Training for and participation in these missions are arduous, somewhat hazardous, and are often sensitive in nature. For these reasons it is a prerequisite that every prospective “Green Beret” successfully completes the 24-day SFAS course and be selected for Special Forces Training.
The SFAS Course assesses and selects soldiers for attendance at the SFQC. This course uses a “Whole Man” selection process that assesses each candidate for six attributes that are important for all Special Forces Soldiers. These attributes are intelligence, trainability, physical fitness, motivation, influence, and judgment.
All candidates participate in a variety of activities designed to place them under various forms of physical and mental stress. It assesses potential and qualities through behavioral observation, analysis via performance measure, and recording data. All tasks are performed in a neutral environment with limited information and no performance feedback.
bragg.army.mil
The SFAS Course assesses and selects soldiers for attendance at the SFQC. This course uses a “Whole Man” selection process that assesses each candidate for six attributes that are important for all Special Forces Soldiers. These attributes are intelligence, trainability, physical fitness, motivation, influence, and judgment.
All candidates participate in a variety of activities designed to place them under various forms of physical and mental stress. It assesses potential and qualities through behavioral observation, analysis via performance measure, and recording data. All tasks are performed in a neutral environment with limited information and no performance feedback.
bragg.army.mil
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